In his famous biography of Churchill, Roy Jenkins writes that the agreement proposed “spheres of influence of realpolitik in the Balkans. The [Churchill] report reported that “The Americans would be shocked if they saw how crudely he had said it.”  Historian David Carlton notes in the same way that “[with the October Treaty], a clear, albeit informal, agreement had been reached on the most important point: he had Stalin`s agreement to treat Greece as he sees fit.”  Anthony Eden wrote that he and Churchill had discussed the subject months before the meeting and that “we felt entitled to ask for Soviet support for our policy towards Greece, in exchange for our support for Soviet policy towards Romania.” The British historian Richard Crampton described the agreement with Churchill and Stalin as “famous” in a “capitable” way that divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence without consulting the peoples concerned.  After Churchill`s description of the incident, Churchill suggested that the Soviet Union should have 90 per cent influence in Romania and 75 per cent in Bulgaria; the UK is expected to have 90 per cent in Greece; And they should each have 50 percent in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Churchill wrote it on a sheet of paper which he pushed back to Stalin, who dragged it and returned it.      The result of these discussions was that the percentages of Soviet influence in Bulgaria and, more importantly, Hungary were changed to 80 percent and Romania to 100 percent. In October 1944, Churchill told Soviet dictator Josef Stalin that they had to put in place an agreement on influence “because the Americans might be shocked.” According to Melvyn Leffler, Churchill sought to “abolish” the percentage agreement after the end of the world war and the image of Greece.  This was particularly the case, with Churchill and Roosevelt keeping such discretion over the agreement that their successors in power did not know it. Meanwhile, Stalin initially believed that the secret agreement was more important than Yalta`s public agreement, which led to his perception of betrayal and the growing urgency to secure friendly governments on the ussr`s border.  In a telegram sent to Roosevelt on 11 October, Churchill wrote: “Stalin and I should try to have a common opinion on the Balkans, so that we can prevent civil wars from taking place in several countries if they and I sympathize with a page and the United States.